I'm not a geopolitical expert, and my research on the Latin American and energy markets is very limited; I'm still learning. But regarding the US's "dealing with" Venezuela, whether you're an expert or not, I believe everyone will be shocked by one thing: this US action didn't use any ideological pretext, didn't shout slogans like "making the world a safe haven for democracy," didn't mention international law, and didn't even support opposition leader and Nobel laureate Machado.

This was a very straightforward and blatant action. You can interpret it however you want; I'm not going to pretend anymore.

This was a very straightforward and blatant action.

Hmm? When major geopolitical tensions escalate in oil-producing countries, don't energy prices usually rise? Why did oil and gas prices plummet this time?

In other words, the market's immediate reaction upon Maduro's downfall was to anticipate increased supply? What was the market's thinking?

In other words, at the moment Maduro fell from power, the market's reaction was to anticipate increased supply? What was the market's thinking?

One interpretation is: The market believes that after Maduro's downfall, Western or pro-Western forces will reactivate Venezuela's oil production, and it is expected that this production will be coordinated, controlled, and quickly released into the market. Therefore, energy traders immediately adjusted their positions to prepare for increased supply, rather than decreased supply. Judging from the price movement, the regime change was anticipated by insiders long ago and planned in advance. (There is ample evidence for this. For example, the New York Times published a full article detailing the arrests on the same day, covering everything from how the CIA planned the operation last year, to how Maduro was cleverly apprehended, and the specifics of how informants were deployed. Such in-depth articles clearly couldn't have been written on the day of the operation; they must have been prepared in advance and released immediately after the action.) Of course, some might say it's because the weekend weather forecast changed, indicating warmer temperatures and a decrease in expected natural gas demand, but the timing seems too coincidental. Therefore, this inevitably leads to the following association: we are witnessing a reversal of a narrative framework in real time. The formation of the post-dollar system may not have been accomplished through Bretton Woods-style international conferences or official declarations, but rather through the quiet repricing of assets. The so-called "new order" may have changed its operating method: it achieves control through market acceptance, narrative reconstruction, and capital flows—rather than through treaty signings or formal declarations. By the time you realize it, prices have already set everything. However, the above are all relatively grand geopolitical narratives. From a market perspective, what everyone is more concerned about is: what impact will this have on the global market? To answer this question, we need to provide some more detailed background information first, otherwise our approach to observing this situation will be inappropriate. There are several main questions: (1) How many types of oil are there? What is the relationship between each type of oil and geopolitics? What type of oil is Venezuelan oil? (2) Is the US action against Venezuela for the sake of oil? (3) How long will Trump pay attention to this? (4) What impact will it have on China? Let's go through them one by one: How many types of oil are there? What is the relationship between each type and geopolitics? "Venezuela has the world's largest oil reserves" - this is the most frequently mentioned sentence. This is a highly generalized statement, easily giving the illusion that Venezuela has a large amount of easily extractable, low-cost oil that can flood the market at any time. But the devil is in the details. To truly understand the value and limitations of Venezuelan oil, a more useful research approach is to first clarify what types of oil exist in the world, what the characteristics of each type are, and how each type relates to geopolitics. For example, which countries are sensitive areas surrounding a particular type of oil? What related wars, proxy wars, or military operations have occurred historically? A summary table is provided: [Image of a PNG file: https://img.jinse.com.cn/7425295_image3.png](https://img.jinse.com.cn/7425295_image3.png) [Image of a PNG file: LKjawIFk8bWKEUX8McsMMinKwPefZfB1M7h9fsDq.png](https://img.jinse.com.cn/7425295_image3.png) [Image of a PNG file: LKjawIFk8bWKEUX8McsMMinKwPefZfB1M7h9fsDq.png) ... What does this mean? This oil is as viscous as asphalt, with an API gravity (an index of petroleum weight, the higher the number, the lighter the oil) typically between 8 and 14 degrees, and it has a high sulfur and metal content. Here are a few key points to clarify: The first is the difference between "technically recoverable" and "economically viable." The U.S. Geological Survey has long estimated that the total reserves of heavy crude oil beneath the Orinoco Belt may be as high as 9 trillion to 14 trillion barrels, of which approximately 3.8 trillion to 6.5 trillion barrels can be recovered using current technology. However, "extractable" does not equate to "worth extracting"—extraction costs, oil price levels, and market demand all affect how much oil can ultimately be converted into cash. The second difference lies in the inherent characteristics of crude oil itself. Orinoco's super-heavy crude oil is difficult to extract—it's as sticky as slime, requiring steam or diluents to flow; transportation is difficult—it must be heated or mixed with lighter oils to pass through pipelines; refining is difficult—ordinary refineries simply cannot handle it, requiring specialized coking and desulfurization equipment. Each step requires additional investment and energy. In other words, Venezuela's underground "barrel of oil" is essentially less valuable than a barrel of oil in the Middle East, and there are far fewer potential buyers globally. Third, ground infrastructure and management capabilities are another major problem. Before the 21st century, Venezuela's state-owned oil company PDVSA was one of the most technologically advanced oil companies in Latin America. However, over the past two decades, political interference, massive layoffs, insufficient investment, international sanctions, corruption, and brain drain have hollowed it out. The result is: aging and leaking gathering pipelines, chronic power shortages, frequent refinery fires, and refining units shutting down every few days. Finally, there is a practical question: who can absorb all this oil? Venezuela's extra-heavy crude oil is only suitable for processing in refineries equipped with complex coking units. These refineries are mainly concentrated along the US Gulf Coast, parts of Asia, and a few in Europe. Many refineries along the Texas Gulf Coast were specifically designed and built for Venezuelan heavy crude. Before sanctions, Venezuela was a key supplier to the US, with a highly integrated supply chain. This explains why the US has always been interested in Venezuelan oil—not because of a lack of oil, but because these refineries need this specific feedstock. Is the US's action against Venezuela for oil? The answer is yes. Javier Blass, author of *The World for Sale*, did the math. Adding US oil production to Canada's, and then to Venezuela and other Latin American countries—from Mexico to Argentina, with Brazil, Guyana, and Colombia in between—these countries together account for nearly 40% of global oil production (note that this is actual production already in the market, not reserves still buried underground requiring time and money to develop). Therefore, if these countries were all under the shadow of "Don Rothschildism" and controlled such a large share of production, the US would have pricing power. Theoretically, the US government could maintain oil prices around $50 per barrel. In the future, whoever tries to push up oil prices by cutting production would be guaranteed to succeed. Venezuelan oil is at least an extra card in this game. Even without Trump, the US oil industry would have thrived thanks to the shale oil revolution, Canadian oil sands development, and new discoveries in Brazil and Guyana. Trump simply brought these resources under Washington's security umbrella. While everyone has learned over the past year that Trump will be involved in tacos, the possibility cannot be completely ruled out. The only "minor issues" are: Can Venezuela reach that production level again? Theoretically, yes. Can it be achieved quickly? Absolutely not. Can it be achieved within five years? Also unlikely.

03How long will Trump pay attention to this?

Last night, while recording a podcast with Zheng Lang to mock Trump, Foreign Policy published an article, which is practically our mouthpiece.