Recently, I've seen some discussion on the Jiaolian platform about how, with the new US president opening the crypto-friendly door, more and more blockchain projects, which previously used foundations or DAOs as a cover for their own success, are now increasingly moving towards direct corporate governance. This, in turn, means fully embracing compliance, pursuing compliant financing and IPOs. In fact, during the 2017-2018 bull market, when the coin issuance craze was surging, why did so many blockchain projects choose to establish foundations in small countries overseas to issue their tokens? The answer is simple and straightforward: the corporate financing route wasn't feasible or timely, so some clever people came up with this "roundabout" solution, euphemistically calling it "compliance." However, this "compliance" doesn't stand up to scrutiny. Look at this compliance. It's complying with the rules of a tiny country far away, yet the money is being collected from the "leeks" of a larger country. How can this be considered compliance? Marijuana is legal in the Netherlands and Canada. Why don't you try smoking some in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, or Shenzhen? But digital currency isn't as stringent as drug control. If the project goes overseas, and the "leeks" inside the Great Firewall shamelessly try to climb over the wall, even using fake identities to buy the other party's coins, it's a case of both sides getting in trouble. Later, regulators were left with no choice but to warn these "leeks": participating in digital currency activities is illegal. If anything goes wrong, you'll be the one to bear the consequences. Don't look to the regulators to enforce your own so-called justice. No ideology can tolerate giant babies indefinitely. Note the word "illegal"; it doesn't mean "illegal," but "unlawful," meaning not protected by law. Being unprotected by law means that if you fall into a trap and lose money, you're on your own. Don't blame the government for your misfortune. The origins of foundations can probably be traced back to Ethereum. Ethereum emerged during the 2013 bull market, a cycle before the coin issuance craze, and pioneered the ICO (initial coin offering) model. Unlike Bitcoin, Ethereum's coin issuance lacks a pre-mine and fair launch. Ethereum mints a large amount of ETH in advance at zero cost, then sells a portion to early investors (effectively a disguised form of financing), while reserving a portion for continued development. These funds can't be left in the hands of a single individual, such as Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin. Therefore, an entity must be established to manage and manage these funds on behalf of the project. To demonstrate the nonprofit nature of this entity, a foundation is a natural choice. In the overseas open source software sector, establishing a foundation to raise funds to support the development of a specific open source software project is a well-established practice. Since a foundation is a legal entity, it is centralized. Unlike the fundraising efforts of open source software foundations, which are more akin to charitable donations, blockchain projects' token fundraising has a strong profit motive, or more bluntly, a get-rich-quick motive. The money you give to an open source software foundation is a donation, bordering on charity, with virtually no direct financial return. The only possible reward is honor. If you "donate" to a blockchain project, you receive a certain number of project tokens in exchange. No matter how much you deny it, most people strongly expect these tokens to surge in value upon the project's success, resulting in substantial profits. Of course, you could argue that buying tokens is a donation, with no promise or expectation of returns. However, regulatory enforcement looks beyond rhetoric and examines the substance. You expect the project to work hard to build and succeed, resulting in a lucrative return. This is known as the "Howey Test" in the United States. If a project token is found to be an investment contract—in other words, a security—then issuing the token becomes illegal, a crime of unlawful issuance of securities. Perhaps this, in turn, explains why Ethereum established a foundation rather than a company. Legally, a foundation is a company, just a nonprofit. Why go to such great lengths to make this centralized entity appear nonprofit in the traditional sense? Because one of the criteria in the Omnibus test requires an expectation of profit from the invested enterprise. So, if this is a foundation, a nonprofit enterprise, with no profits, does that mean it doesn't meet the Omnibus test's violation criteria? In fact, this tactic has long been used by listed internet companies. Haven't you seen some major internet companies listed overseas deliberately smear their financial statements as losses, despite being clearly profitable? They euphemistically call these losses strategic. Their goal is to trade operational losses for excess reinvestment, which in turn fuels hypergrowth, which in turn fuels hypergrowth for excessive stock price increases. Ultimately, they trade losses in their domestic markets for skyrocketing stock prices in overseas markets, thereby achieving the ultimate goal of reducing domestic tax payments and increasing overseas profits. And behind them often stands Wall Street financial capital. Under these tactics, listed companies become conduits for the vast transfer of wealth. Instead of transforming China's demographic and infrastructure dividends into national tax revenue and public welfare benefits, they divert them into dividends for overseas shareholders, transferring them to the pockets of company founders, veterans, investors, and Wall Street financial capital. It's clear that the foundation model of Web3 in its early years simply copied Web2's strategic losses and used a non-profit foundation to solidify the framework. By the time meme coins developed in 2023-2024, the rules of the game had evolved further. Doesn't your OmniVision test state that investors' profits must come from the efforts of others (usually the project owner)? I'll simply state the obvious: the project owner didn't intend to put in any effort at all! How can you prove they didn't put in any effort? There's no project owner. Without a project owner, no one is committed to putting in any effort. Without effort, there's no profit to be made from that hard work. Without profit, there's no possibility of earning a profit from the profits generated by the project. This certainly doesn't meet the definition of a security under the Omniscient Test. So what is this thing? It's pure speculation, pure and simple. After Trump personally posted a Trump meme, the US securities regulator, the SEC, also issued a solemn statement stating that meme coins are indeed not securities! Regarding this, you can review the Jiaolian article "Trump Meme Kicks Off Crazy 2025" from January 18, 2025, and the Jiaolian internal reference "SEC Gives Trump a Favor, Congress Helps Weld Car Doors Shut" from February 28, 2025. The leeks were dumbfounded. Isn't this just exploiting a legal loophole? But they're actually playing by the established rules of the game. The reason leeks are leeks is that they actually believe the scythe is playing fair with them, on the same level. They then fantasize about surviving, or even becoming rich, under the scythe's sharp harvest. The logic of capitalist rule of law is that the law prohibits using A, B, C, or D to exploit the leeks. But if someone innovates and uses something neither B nor D, and actually succeeds, then not only will they not be condemned, but they will actually be applauded for their innovative and ingenious exploitation. Less impressive projects will choose not to establish foundations, instead letting the community form a so-called DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) to demonstrate their innocence—but we truly don't have any project party working on the project; it's all community-driven. And yet, powerful projects like the Trump Meme openly use a company as their operating entity and project owner. After all, they wield higher-level bourgeois legal power and can even modify laws and regulations to their advantage. Project developers, previously secretive and willing to tout decentralization as a means of profiteering, are gradually realizing the truth: Big Brother is about to lead everyone in a mad dash! Consequently, over the past six months, we've seen an increasing number of blockchain projects returning to centralized corporate structures, no longer shying away from the notion of a substantial centralized entity manipulating their projects. Some are even entering the traditional securities market and adopting traditional, compliant financing methods. This bull market has also gained a more high-sounding narrative, one that excites the profiteers: institutional bullishness. Beneath the hype, people may have long forgotten, or perhaps never cared, that BTC has never had a foundation, DAO, or company. BTC has never had any so-called governance, so why does it need a centralized entity to assume governance responsibility? It simply persists in moving ever closer to decentralization. The slippery slope fallacy always occurs. Once we accept a little bit of centralization, the entire project will gradually slide towards centralization. Perhaps, if decentralization is not absolute, it is absolutely not decentralized. ... On Wednesday, September 10, 2025, BTC remained around 111,000. USDT 7.11, USD/CNH 7.13. The US dollar index continues to consolidate below 98 points. Gold is temporarily consolidating at a high level after breaking through its all-time high of $3,600. The September 10th Teaching Chain internal report, approximately 2,500 words long, covers: BTC remains stable at $110,000, the US dollar index is sideways, gold hits a new record high, and expectations of a Fed rate cut are rising; the attempted NPM supply chain attack warns of crypto security risks, while renewed miner selling pressure signals a bullish outlook; the looming bubble of DAT treasury companies calls into question the profit-sharing model of altcoins; the concept of walletless wallets, etc.
Catherine
Anais
Weatherly
Kikyo