I have a junk coin and I never set a stop loss. Then it was removed from the market by a major exchange and its price dropped drastically. Now all my losses are gone. There is no need to set a stop loss and I can just record the loss directly.
Uniswap v2, to v3, to v4, one of the main lines of update is to modify the transaction fee, especially
Briefly describe
v2\v3\v4the innovation of transaction fees. V2is the handling fee of all pools is 0.3%, and the handling fee is directly converted intoPTO. leaf="">kenPart of.
V3, provides four types of handling fees, 、0.3%and1%, and the handling fee and PoS (v3PoS,v2is called lptoken) is separate, that is, the handling fee will not be automatically reinvested into PoS.
V4, theoretically provides an unlimited number of service fees, and the service fee collection mechanism is coded and customized. In theory, service fees can be used to regulate (encourage or suppress) trading behavior, and can also be used to regulate the impermanent loss of
PoS. Compared with cex, the transaction fee mechanism has been very mature for a long time, and it seems that there has been no change in the past ten years. The core is userviplevel, platform currency payment of fees and other things.
From the fee innovation on uniswap, I have a magical idea. I think cexcan also innovate the transaction fees.
Delisting a token is actually a lose-lose situation, at least in the short term. The project owner, Hodler users, and the exchange itself all lose money.
If the exchange uses different fees for different currencies instead of delisting, is it a better mechanism?
For example, the exchange splits the transaction fee of a pair of trading pairs (such as eth/usdt) into a basic fee and a punitive fee. The basic fee is the current fee policy of the exchange.
The punitive fee is an innovative mechanism, and the default is 0 .
If CEX is not satisfied with a certain coin, the current practice is to issue a warning notice and then remove it from the shelves. If there is a punitive fee, the mechanism of increasing the punitive fee can be used to punish the token.
and the proportion of punitive fees is adjustable, from 0to 10%. Haha, 100% means that the transaction is confiscated, haha. Punitive fees can also be set to be paid by the seller or the buyer, or even by the seller to the buyer, or vice versa, just like the funding rate of perpetual contracts. This can adjust the degree of incentives for buyers or sellers. Of course, the default is to go to the exchange. Perhaps, the punitive fees received by the exchange can also be used to establish an ecological development fund to support the development of this coin, or sponsor the foundation to continue its efforts. But in this case, it can no longer be called a punitive fee, but should be changed to an ecological construction fee.
Many projects now lack development funds, or the coin foundation is short of money.
For a long time, the foundations of cryptocurrency projects have been trying to receive extra coins from miners to cover the operating costs of the foundation. The most successful one is
Dash coin, which draws 10%of the mining output as the foundation's income. LTCandBCHhave tried to use the output of miners to sponsor developers, but failed. Why not try to get some money from trading users to sponsor development?
If the exchange can set a voluntary ecological construction fee for users, such as btc-usdtthis trading pair, a default closure can be set, and users can choose whether to contribute a little bit (10,0001?, 100 million
1? ) fees, which are collected and used to sponsor specificbitcoin coredevelopers. Of course, this is complicated.
Is it better to express warnings and urge projects to improve through punitive fees on tokens than to remove them across the board?
The biggest problem is that trading users do not like trading friction. Users will take the initiative to withdraw their coins to exchanges with lower handling fees, but this is better than delisting and not providing users with additional options.
I feel that it is feasible.